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ABSTRACT

This article examines the legal justification and practical application of recent Florida
Supreme Court decisions classifying all comprehensive plan amendments as legislative decisions
and all other zoning changes as quasi-judicial. The author outlines historical trends and concerns
relating to the appropriate standard of judicial review for zoning actions, followed by a review of
the evolution of the statutes and case law in Florida. The article challenges the standard of
deference for legislative review of zoning actions based on separation of powers and due
process. It also identifies inconsistencies in Florida case law and inequities in local government
processes for reviewing small-scale amendments and rezonings. The article concludes that
classifying all amendments as legislative is not adequately reasoned or justified and leads to
inconsistent and inequitable results. In addition, it provides recommendations for legislative
reform.
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CAN FLORIDA’S LEGISLATIVE STANDARD OF REVIEW FOR SMALL-SCALE
LAND USE AMENDMENTS BE JUSTIFIED?

I. INTRODUCTION

To rezone a 1.3 acre plot from residential low-density to commercial community-general,
the City of Jacksonville exercised a state-mandated two stage process that entailed reviewing
policy implications and submitting a copy of the proposed change to a state agency.1 On the
other hand, a zoning ordinance to add up to 600 multi-family residential units in an 885-acre
tract did not require any policy analysis or submission to the state, but rather was subject to a
review only of the impact of the change on the local comprehensive plan. 2 These apparently
inconsistent processes result from the application of recent Florida Supreme Court decisions that
apply a “bright-line“ rule classifying allcomprehensive plan amendments as legislative decisions
subject to a highly deferential judicial review and all other zoning changes as quasi-judicial
decisions subject to a more stringent judicial review.3
This article examines whether this “bright line” rule is appropriate based on its legal
justification and practical application. Part II outlines historical trends and concerns relating to
the classification and the standard of judicial review for zoning actions. Part III reviews the
evolution of the statutes and case law in Florida, including examples of the impact of the court’s
decisions. Part IV challenges the high deference of review afforded legislative zoning actions
and identifies inconsistencies and inequities in the Florida process for reviewing amendments
and rezonings. Finally, Part V summarizes the author’s rationale for concluding that designating
all amendments as legislative is not justified and has resulted in the lack of a uniform, rational
means for classifying land use decisions. In addition, it provides recommendations for legislative
reform.
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II. BACKGROUND

A. Zoning and Comprehensive Planning

In the landmark 1926 case of Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., the Supreme Court
validated local government zoning and planning as means to exercise state police power.4 The
Standard State Zoning Enabling Act (SZEA
) provided guidelines to the states in adopting,
amending and enforcing zoning statutes.5 The SZEA stipulates that zoning regulations are to be
established in accordance with a comprehensive plan.6 A comprehensive plan is a document
prepared by a local government to serve as the basis for future decisions on zoning. It is future
oriented, intended to anticipate and account for growth and change.7
Because of the extreme difficulty in accurately predicting future growth needs and
because of a plan’s inherent transitory nature, there is an ongoing need to amend the provisions
of a comprehensive plan. Florida statutes, for example, mandate a revised plan every five years
and provide procedures for regular and special amendments.8 The classification of amendments
and the ultimate procedure for adopting and challengingthem
is a major theme

of this article.9

An amendment to the comprehensive plan may be initiated by persons seeking a use not
allowed by the plan or to eliminate a use that is permitted under the plan. The amended plan by
itself typically does not permit a landowner a different use of his land. Rather, it changes the map
that designates future land use (future land use map or FLUM).10 The landowner must then file
for a zoning ordinance that achieves the desired zoning change.11
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B. Standards for Judicial Review of Zoning Decisions

1. Classifying Zoning Decisions Based on Effect on Policy
One can categorize local government decisions affecting land use based on how they
relate to policy. Some decisions, such as adoption of a comprehensive land use plan or a major
revision of the plan, are clearly policy-making acts. Decisions that formulate policy are
classified as legislative actions based on the general function of that branch of government to
establish broad goals and directions for the general welfare of the community.12 Other decisions,
such as granting a special use permit to a landowner who meets the specified requirements, are
characterized as the application of a previously determined policy to a new parcel of land.13
Decisions that apply or interpret policies set by legislators are classified as judicial or quasijudicial actions.14 In between these two examples of land use changes, which are clearly either
policy making or policy application, lies a middle ground where it is not always evident whether
the decision-making body is formulating or applying policy.
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Examples are major rezonings

within a designated land use and small-scale amendments to a comprehensive plan.16 How a
zoning decision is classified or labeled can profoundly influence the process for the decision and
the outcome of a challenge to that decision.17

2. Decisions and Commentaries on Classifying Zoning Decisions
a) Euclid “Fairly Debatable” Standard to Classify Zoning Decisions
In the early stages of zoning, the Supreme Court established that zoning actions were
legislative and that the decisions of a local government would not be overturned unless they were
"clearly arbitrary and unreasonable, having no substantial relation to the public health, safety,
morals, or general welfare."18 This standard is highly deferential to the legislature and became
known as the “fairly debatable” standard.19 Through the 1960’s, almost all courts followed this
rule for classifying zoning decisions.20
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b) Fasano v. Board of County Comm'rs of Washington County21
The Oregon Supreme Court was among the first courts to question the Euclid rationale.
In Fasano, several homeowners opposed a developer’s requested change of zoning from single
family residential to planned residential, which allowedfor a mobile home park.

22

The county

board of commissioners approved the developer’s request, overriding the vote of the planning
commission, based on a finding that the increased density and different type of housing would
help to meet the needs of urbanization.23 In denying the homeowners’ challenge, the county had
argued that the board’s decision was legislative and that the homeowners would need to show
that the county had acted arbitrarily (i.e., it sought to apply the fairly debatable standard). 24
In affirming the lower courts’ decision in favor of the homeowners, the Oregon Supreme
Court noted that “a determination whether the permissible use of a specific piece of property
should be changed is usually an exercise of judicial authority…”25 The court firmly rejected the
notion that the judicial review of the zoning action was limited to whether the change was
arbitrary and capricious.26

c) Other State Court Opinions
In explaining its holding, the Fasano court identified examples of other state supreme
courts that had disputed the notion that all zoning decisions were legislative.27 The Washington
Supreme Court explained that, in its role as a fact finding tribunal, the local planning
commission more closely resembles a quasi-judicial proceeding than a legislative one.28
Supporting this trend, the Colorado Supreme Court in Snyder v. Lakewood distinguished between
a judicial process that enacts a rezoning ordinance and a legislative process that enacts the
general ordinance.29 In a subsequent decision, however, the Colorado Supreme Court partially
overruled Lakewood, declaring that an amendment to a zoning ordinance is a legislative act.30
Some states rejected the trend initiated by Fasano and retained the Euclid fairly debatable
standard.31 The California Supreme Court declared unequivocally that “zoning ordinances,
whatever the size of parcel affected, are legislative acts.”32 The court in Arnel Dev. Co. v. Costa
7

Mesa further explained that classifying smaller zoning ordinance as quasi-judicial would unsettle
well established rules, would create confusion resulting in time-consuming litigation, and would
not be necessary.33

d) Florida Decisions
As of 1989, according to one commentator, about ten states had adopted the Fasano
quasi-judicial standard.34 In 1993, Florida joined this select group with the holding in Board of
County Comm'rs v. Snyder that certain rezoning actions were quasi-judicial.35 Florida had
adopted the Euclid standard in City of Miami Beach v. Ocean & Inland Co.,36 but Florida courts
had experienced a great deal of controversy regarding the appropriate standard of review.37

3. Procedures for Challenging Zoning Decisions
a) Challenging Legislative Decisions
The SZEA provides procedures for reviewing quasi-judicial actions (i.e., decisions by
boards of adjustors), but does not provide comparable procedures for reviewing legislative
actions.38 Because most state statutes also do not prescribe procedures for reviewing legislative
decisions on zoning, the courts will only permit a de novo appeal.39 Under a de novo appeal, an
appellant can seek declaratory judgment and injunctive relief.40 In reviewing the decision, the
court applies the highly deferential “fairly debatable” standard.41
For a de novo review of a zoning decision, there is a rebuttable presumption that the
ordinance is valid; the challenger must prove by clear and convincing evidence that the
ordinance is “arbitrary and capricious.”42 The procedure entails first reviewing the property
owner’s evidence to determine if he has been able to overcome the presumption of validity.43
The court then reviews the local government evidence to determine if it presents a “fairly
debatable” response to the landowner claims.44

b) Challenging Quasi-Judicial Decisions
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For a quasi-judicial or administrative decision, the court is less deferential in its scope of
review. The standards and procedures for this review are often prescribed by state administrative
procedure acts,45 as well as by the SZEA.46 The party challenging the decision files a writ of
certiorari.47 Under state administrative acts, quasi-judicial zoning decisions are presumed valid
and afforded some deference based on the expertise of the board of adjustors, but not as much
deference as for legislative decisions.48
Most state statutes require substantial evidence to support a quasi-judicial or
administrative action.49 The Fifth Circuit of the United States Court of Appeals (Fifth Circuit)
noted that quasi-judicialdecision s are reviewed to determine whether they are substantiated by
the record.50 The same court further noted that legislative zoning decision are reviewed to
determine if the government could reasonably conceive the determinative facts as true.51 The
Seventh Circuit observed that “[L]egislatures can base their action on considerations-such as the
desire of a special interest group… that would be thought improper in judicial decisionmaking.”52 In Florida, the appropriate standard of review for quasi-judicial decisions is
competent substantial evidence.53 The requirement of competent substantial evidence is more
stringent (i.e., more difficult for a local government to conform to) than the fairly debatable
criterion and is often referred to as “strict scrutiny.” One should not, however, confusethis level
of scrutiny with the strict scrutiny applied to equal protection and other constitutional tests.54

C. Zoning Practices and Abuses

1. Examples of Abuses and Deficiencies
Major factors in the need for legislation and alternative judicial treatment of land use
decision have been actual and potential abuses in the decision-makingprocess .55 Richard
Babcock’s 1966 book on zoning provided the first comprehensive review of zoning practice in
the United States.56 The book outlined general deficiencies of zoning due to: the lack of
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administrative procedures; the lack of ethics of politicians and developers; the bias in local
decision-making: and the dearth of overall planning.57
In an update of the 1966 book, Babcock and Simon observed many of the same problems
documented in the original.58 In spite of new zoning and increased use of planning, certain
factors such as localism, greed and xenophobia were still present.59 The authors documented
cases in San Antonio, Chicago, and Lafayette, Louisiana, in which decisions by local legislative
bodies were decided largely on political considerations.60 In Chicago, for example, the mayor
and the city evaded for fifteen years a judge’s order to build public housing in white areas after a
finding that the city had segregated blacks into one all-black area.61 The authors maintain that
“the process of land use control remains unfair,” as it has been for fifty years.62 Parochial
interests, e.g., the NIMBY63 attitude, have resulted in manipulation of the system by those with
the power to do so.64 The authors contend that the main question is “whether the judiciary is
qualified to deal effectively with these issues.”65
In an overview of zoning, law professor Robert Wright observed that the widespread
abuse of the process of rezoning has encouraged courts to rethink the traditional approach for
classifying zoning decision.66 He noted that zoning is an ad hoc process which is more
administrative or quasi judicial than legislative and that a rezoning ordinance is often not the
result of a comprehensive plan.67 He further observed thatdevelopers and other real estate
interests, who frequently predominate on planning commissions, have a very strong influence on
the decisions.68 As a result, a commission may approve a project over the opposition of the
professional staff.69 He suggested that courts have recognized that the process is essentially an
administrative, often politically tainted, process and questioned whether it is legislative.70

2. Comment from Courts on Abuse
Judge Grimes in Snyder claimed that local zoning rules are very inconsistent, implying
that the fairly debatable rule was a factor.71 He also cited criticism by Babcock (deploring the
effect of “neighborhoodism and rank political influence on zoning “)72 and by Mandelker and
Tarlock (that zoning decision are too often ad hoc and self serving…).73 The Fasano court
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asserted that quasi-judicial review for rezoning is justified because of the almost irresistible
pressures that can be asserted by private economic interests on local governments.74 Both Fasano
and Snyder changed the standard of review of certain zoning actions from legislative to quasijudicial in efforts to reduce the abuses and conflicts of interest.75

3. Commentaries on Alternative Standards of Review
This divergence of opinion on how to classify land use decisions led to a plethora of legal
analysis and commentary. An editor of The Urban Lawyer applauded the Fasano court for
providing a logical basis for judicial review of rezoning decision.76 He enthusiastically agreed
that the benefit of judicial review in controlling development and in preserving use for its desired
purposes greatly outweighed any disadvantages.77 A city attorney from Austin, Texas
recommended that his state follow the Oregon approach.78 He warned that the inadequacy of
standards of review for rezoning cases increased the likelihood that zoning decisions would be
based on the extent of lobbying instead of the merits of the case.79
An Illinois law professor agreed that courts should use a functional analysis (similar to
that described in Fasano) for small rezonings because they more closely resemble judicial acts
than legislative acts.80 Their primary impact falls on only a few landowners.81 He asserted that
many courts fail to provide due process protection to legislative decisions.82 As a result, he
maintained, several states adopted the Fasano approach primarily because it provides due
process safeguards.83
A California commentator argued that her state’s insistence on the fairly debatable rule
for all zoning actions was unfair to small landowners.84 She advocated increased statutory
protection by requiring legislative decisions to be supported by findings, byincreasing the
number of hearings and dissemination, and by allowing victims of arbitrary or discriminatory
land use decision to recover attorney fees for successful challenges.85 In his comprehensive
review of Snyder, Thomas Pelham, a prominent Florida land use attorney strongly opposed the
quasi-judicial standard for amendments to a comprehensive plan.86 Overall, however, the
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commentators strongly supported the principle of classifying at least some rezoning actions as
quasi-judicial rather than legislative.

III. FLORIDA LAW FOR PLAN AMENDMENTS AND REZONINGS

A. Administrative Procedures for Amendments and Rezonings

1. Amending a Comprehensive Plan
a) Requirements for Comprehensive Plans
Consistent with the SZEA, the Florida legislature enacted Growth Management Acts in
1975 and 198587 requiring local governments to adopt local comprehensive plans consistent
with the Act.88 The local plans must establish “principles, guidelines and standards for the
orderly and balanced future economic, social, physical, environmental and fiscal development of
the area.”89 The plans must include specified elements, including a future land use element
(FLUE).90 The FLUE must contain a future land use map (FLUM), which designates the
permissible land use classifications (e.g., commercial, residential, conservation, industrial, and
agricultural) for all the various plots and parcels.

b) Proposal- First Stage Review
The process to develop or amend a comprehensive plan involves two stages, a proposal
stage and an adoption stage.91 Based on its own initiative or from a constituent, the designated
local planning agency (LPA) of the local government prepares a draft amendment to the
comprehensive plan.92 Following a public hearing by the local government,93 the LPA submits
the draft for review to the Florida Department of Community Affairs (DCA), the state-wide
agency that oversees land planning.94 The draft is also sent to the appropriate regional planning
council, as well as to the regional water management district, state Departments of
Transportation and Environmental Protection, and other public agencies.95 The DCA has
12

discretion on whether to review, but must conduct the review if requested to do so by a regional
planning council, an affected person, or the local government that submitted the amendment.96

c) Adoption- Second Stage Review
The procedure for adoption depends on whether the DCA reviews the proposed
amendment. If the DCA reviews the amendment, it issues an ORC (Objections,
Recommendations and Comments) report.97 Following a second public hearing, the local
government has sixty days to adopt the amendment as originally drafted, to adopt the amendment
with change, or to decide not to adopt the amendment. 98 If the DCA has not reviewed the
amendment, and there are no proposed changes or objections from any affected party, the
amendment can be adopted directly.99 After the local government adopts the amendment, it
resubmits the amendment to DCA and the Regional Planning Commission for review. 100 The
Florida statute does not give DCA or the governor authority to adopt, repeal or revise the
amendment.101 The teeth is the authority to levy sanctions, mostly economic (e.g., withhold
funds for roads or water systems) if the plan or amendment is out of compliance.102

2. Special Requirements for Small-Scale Amendments
In 1995 the Florida legislature exempted small scale amendments from several of the
requirements described above.103 The act defined a small-scale amendment as follows:104
•

It involves land use of ten acres or less.

•

It does not involve a text change to the goals, policies or objectives of the comprehensive
plan. A land use change to the FLUM is considered a small-scale amendment.
In the proposal phase,105 the small-scale amendment requires only one hearing compared

to two hearings for a general amendment.106 Similar to the procedure for a standard plan
amendment, the local government submits the proposed amendment to the DCA and other
government or public agencies.107 The DCA, however, has indicated that it does not review
small scale proposals.108 Furthermore, in the adoption stage, the local government is not required
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to submit the amendment to the DCA as is required for a standard amendment.109 Municipalities
and counties are permitted to adopt small-scale amendments immediately upon conclusion of the
adoption hearing.110 Table 1 summarizes the differences between processes for standard and
small-scale amendments.
Table 1: Differences Between Standard and Small-Scale Amendments
Action
Area involved
Plan Content
Frequency of amendment

Public Hearings
Submission for review
DCA review

Statute
Public Hearings
Adoption options by local
government
Submittal to DCA

Standard Amendment
Small-Scale Amendment
General Provisions; § 163.3187(1)(c)1
More than ten acres
Ten acres or less
Any content change
No change in FLUM or text
Twice a year maximum
Any time*
First Stage- Proposal
§ 163.3184(15)
§ 163.3187(1)(c)
Two required
One required
Sent to DCA & other agencies
Sent to DCA & other agencies
Discretionary; Review if request by
DCA does not review
local government or affected party ;
Second Stage- Adoption
§ 163.3184(7)(a)
§ 163.3184(7)(a)
One public hearing
One public hearing
• Adopt with changes;
• Adopt with changes;
• Adopt without changes; or
• Adopt without changes; or
• Not adopt
• Not adopt
Sent to DCA & other agencies
Not required unless challenged

* Small-scale amendments are limited on cumulative acreage per year.

3. Comparing Small-Scale Amendments and Rezonings
Not only are small-scale amendments treated differently than standard (large scale)
amendments, but in many localities, the processing of small-scale amendments is similar to that
of rezonings not involving an amendment. The example below compares a municipality’s
process for a rezoning with that for a small-scale amendment.
The City of Jacksonvilleprocessed a request to allow commercial development on a 1.3
acre plot for a property that had been residential.111 The new use required a change in the land
use designation of the FLUM from LDR (low density residential) to CGC (community general
commercial)112 and a change in the zoning district within the new land use designation from
RDR (residential low density) to CCG (commercial community general).113
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The city processed the two changes in tandem. A tandem process requires that the board
of commissioners deliberate first on the amendment to the comprehensive plan to determine if
the general type of development sought should be permitted.114 Once the amendment has been
approved, the board considers the suitability of the proposed rezoning.115 The new land use
sought by the City of Jacksonville thus required two separate ordinances to be reviewed in
tandem. The first ordinance, which changed the land use designation map (the FLUM), was
considered a small-scale amendment to the city’s comprehensive plan.116 The second ordinance,
proposing a change from one permitted zoning class to another within a land use designation,
was a rezoning, not entailing any change to the comprehensive plan.117 The specificprocedures
that the city followed are summarized below.

a) Procedural Steps for Small-Scale Amendment Ordinance 2004-5118
1. Ordinance is proposed by property owner, developer or member of city council.119
2. Following notice, the planning and development department held a public information
workshop; considered comments; prepared a report; and rendered a favorable advisory
opinion to city council.120
3. The planning commission (the local planning agency) held a public meeting after notice;
considered comments at the meeting; and recommended approval to city council.121
4. The land use and zoning committee held a public meeting after notice; considered
comments; and recommended approval to city council.122
5. The city council held a public meeting after notice, considering public comments and
recommendations of other committees.123
6. The city council determined the bill was necessary to achieve specified general goals of
the comprehensive plan and adopted the ordinance based on its statutory authority.124

b) Procedural Steps for Rezoning Ordinance 2004-6125
1. Ordinance is initiated by a property owner, developer or member of city council.126
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2. The planning and development department considered the ordinance and rendered an
advisory opinion that it was consistent with the city’s 2010 comprehensive plan.127
3. The planning commission considered the ordinance and rendered a favorable advisory
opinion.128
4. The Land Use and Zoning Committee, after notice, held a public hearing and made a
favorable recommendation to city council.129
5. The city council held a public meeting after notice and considered public comments
along with recommendations of other committees.130
6. The city councildetermined that the ordinance met the general requirements (similar to
the purpose of a plan) and the objectives of the PUD section of the zoning code and
adopted the zoning change.131

These procedures, though based on different statutory requirements, are nearly identical
and do not support a claim of qualitatively different evaluation processes. Because the city
defined the small-scale amendment as a legislative process and the rezoning as a quasi-judicial
process, it utilized slightly different formalities in the review procedures. These are, however,
distinctions without any differences. The first five steps, consisting of initiation, internal review,
public meetings, and hearings, were identical. Step 6, the justifications for the need for the
changes, differed slightly as they were keyed to the specific requirements for the two types of
action. What is most significant is that the two actions, nominally so similar, will be treated
substantially differently if challenged by an affected party.132

B. Florida Supreme Court Decisions Affecting Standards of Review for
Rezonings and for Plan Amendments
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The recent history of the development of the standard of review is dominated by three
Florida Supreme Court decisions, which form the basis of the current law in Florida.

1. Snyder Functional Analysis Test for Classifying Zoning Decisions133
In 1993, the Florida Supreme Court established a functional analysis test that classified a
zoning decision as legislative if it formulated land use policy and as quasi-judicial if it merely
applied policy.134 The Snyders sought to rezone their property to a classification allowing up to
fifteen units per acre.135 The county staff recommended denial of the rezoning application
because the property was located in the one-hundred year flood plain in which only two units per
acre were permitted.136 Based on the Snyders’ plan to raise the land elevation to eliminate the
flood plain concern, the planning and zoning board voted to approve the requested zoning
change.137 However, as a result of citizen opposition based on increased traffic, the commission
ultimately denied the rezoning request without providing a reason.138
In affirming the lower court reversal, the Fifth District Court of Appeal explained that “ a
rezoning action which entails the application of a general rule or policy to specific individuals,
interests or activities is quasi judicial in nature,” requiring a standard of review stricter than the
“fairly debatable” standard applied to legislative matters.139 Applying these principles to the
Snyders’ circumstances, the state supreme court found that the petition for rezoning was
consistent with the comprehensive plan and that the government had not sufficiently asserted the
public need for a more restrictive zoning classification.140 Thus, there was no basis for the
board’s denial of the rezoning.141
The court concluded that “[i]t is the character of the hearing that determines whether or
not board action is legislative or quasi-judicial.” 142 The court adopted its explanation of the
general distinction from a 1935 case.143
A judicial or quasi-judicial act determines the rules of law applicable, and the
rights affected by them, in relation to past transactions. On the other hand, a
quasi-legislative or administrative order prescribes what the rule or requirement of
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administratively determined duty shall be with respect to transactions to be
executed in the future, in order that same shall be considered lawful.144
It then applied that principle to land use decisions. “Rezoning actions which have an
impact on a limited number of persons or property owners, on identifiable parties and interests,
where the decision is contingent on a fact or facts ….. are quasi-judicial actions…”145 Based on
this analysis, the court concluded that the Snyders’ rezoning application was “ in the nature of a
quasi-judicial proceeding….”146
The court established the following process for reviewing a rezoning application:
1) A property owner has the initial burden of proof that rezoning is consistent with the
comprehensive plan and rezoning procedures.147
2) The burden then shifts to the local government’s review board to establish that
maintaining the existing classification accomplishes a legitimate government purpose
and that the denial is not “ arbitrary, discriminatory, or unreasonable.” The board is not
required to make findings of fact, but it must show that the ruling was supported by
“competent substantial evidence.” 148

2. Yusem Holds that Comprehensive Plan Amendments are Legislative Decisions149
In 1997, the Court established the rule that an amendment to a local government’s
comprehensive plan is by definition formulation of policy and hence legislative in nature.150
Yusem, a landowner, sought to change the use of a fifty-four acre plot to estate density (two
units per acre). 151 According to the FLUM of Martin County’s revised comprehensive plan,
Yusem’s plot was part of a 900-acre tract that was designated rural density (one residence per
two acres).152 Yusem applied to the board of commissioners for an amendment to the future land
use map.153 The board submitted the proposed amendment to theFlorida DCA, which
recommended that the county deny the amendment or revise the analysis to justify a showing of
consistency with the more intensive nearby land use.154 When the board decided to deny the
proposal rather than revise it, Yusem filed for declaratory and injunctive relief.155 In a divided
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opinion with a strong dissent from Judge (now Justice) Pariente,156 the Fourth District Court of
Appeal, relying on Snyder, affirmed the circuit court decision to grant the motions. 157
After reviewing the detailed protocols for a plan amendment, the Florida Supreme Court
concluded that amendments to a comprehensive plan are legislative decisions, even “in respect to
only one piece of property.”158 The court’s decision limited the use of the functional analysis test
to strict rezonings.159 It distinguished plan amendments such as that of Yusem from rezonings,
such as the one in Snyder.160 In a well-noted footnote, the court, recognizing that the 1995
amendment to the statute provided special treatment for proposed small- scale amendments to the
comprehensive plan, chose not to include those amendments in its holding, noting that “[w]e do
not make any findings concerning the appropriate standard of review for these small scale
developments.”161
The court explained that because a land use plan is “like a constitution for all future
development…,” functional analysis is not appropriate for comprehensive plan amendments.162
Reviewing a proposed amendment requires a county to “engage in policy reformulation…’ and
to decide if changes were warranted to promote “orderly development of the County’s future
growth.”163 The county would also be required to evaluate the impact of the amendment on other
county activities relating to future growth.164 The court noted that this decision involved
considerations “well beyond the landowner’s fifty four acres.”165
The court further justified its conclusion that amendments are legislative decisions by
outlining the multi- stage review process required under Florida law.166 Thus the court
concluded, an amendment requires “strict oversight on the several levels of government,” in
contrast to rezoning request, which is evaluated on the local level only.167

3. Courts’ Applications of Snyder and Yusem
Snyder, as a major departure from previous practice elicited significant criticism.168
Following Yusem, courts were divided on whether small-scale amendment were legislative or
quasi-judicial.169 In Fleeman, the Fifth District Court of Appeal held that the request to change
the land use of a 0.26-acre plot was a small-scale amendment to the comprehensive plan and
19

constituted a legislative act.170 The court added that this case was a good example of the need to
define a small-scale amendment as a legislative policy decision.171 Even though it was a small
parcel, its proximity to the ocean and to a major thoroughfare suggested important policy
concerns.172 These concerns are “better left to the legislative body, with limited judicial
review.”173
In Grondin, a circuit court held that a small-scale amendment was a quasi-judicial
action.174 The court first established that the zoning change of a three-acre parcel from single
family to commercial qualified as a small-scale amendment under the statutes, as the proposed
change was consistent with the stated policies of comprehensive plan and would not result in a
change in the text of the comprehensive plan. 175 According to the court, the proposed land use
change was not the broad formulation of policy associated with a legislative decision; rather the
city’s decision more closely resembled an application of the comprehensive plan.176 Finding that
the city decision was not supported by competent substantial evidence, the court quashed the
city’s denial of the amendment. 177

4. Coastal Extends Bright-Line Rule to Small-Scale Amendments178
In 2001, the Court confirmed that the Yusem bright-linerule for classifying
comprehensive plan amendments as legislative also applied to small-scale amendments.179
Coastal Development of North Florida, Inc. (Coastal Development), seeking to change the
FLUM designation of 1.7 acres of property from residential to commercial, submitted an
application showing it met five of the six criteria for an amendment.180 At a hearing before the
planning commission, where Coastal Development’s experts were opposed by citizens objecting
to the traffic, the commission and the city council turned down the request as not consistent with
the plan’s goals of first infilling existing commercial space.181
The dispute ultimately reached the Florida Supreme Court, which held that small-scale
comprehensive plan amendments are legislative decisions subject to the fairly-debatable standard
of review.182 While recognizing that the procedure for small-scale amendment is somewhat
different from that of a standard amendment, the court maintained that this proceeding still
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allows the DCA to intervene and an affected person to challenge whether an adopted amendment
complies with the statute.183
The court endorsed the statement by Pelham184 that even for a single tract of land, one
must consider the entire comprehensive plan and not just the FLUM.185 The court explained that
the FLUM, as part of the comprehensive plan, is itself a policy decision.186 Any change in the
FLUM requires the local government to re-examine policy, even if the amendment to the FLUM
is consistent with the textual goals and objectives of the comprehensive plan.187 The court
distinguished a change in the FLUM (which formulates policy) with a change that is consistent
with the FLUM (which applies policy).188 In addition, no matter what the size of the
amendment, the local government must determine whether the reformulation of policies is
socially desirable.189 This determination will force the local government to consider the expected
impact on other government services such as traffic and utilities.190 These considerations differ
from the considerations involved in a rezoning. 191 Judge Wells concluded 1) that although
small-scale amendments lack mandatory DCA oversight, alternate remedies are available to any
aggrieved parties that are not available in standard rezoning actions; and 2) the decision
reinforces the policy of uniformity and certainty in land use decisions.192

IV. ANALYSIS OF THE LEGISLATIVE STANDARD OF REVIEW FOR SMALLSCALE AMENDMENTS
The author’s challenges to the general validity of legislativere view of small-scale
amendments are based on: lack of separation of powers for local decisions: the limited due
process for legislative actions: and the enhanced potential for abuse with legislative processes.
Florida specific challenges include: the lack of consistency among the key Florida Supreme
Court cases; and inequities in processes for small-scale amendments, large scale amendments
and rezonings.

A. Challenging theLegislative Standard of Review for Zoning Actions
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1. Local Governments do not Provide True Separation of Powers
The special nature of the lawmaking process as justification for great deference to
legislative decisions may not be valid at the local level of government. The separation of powers
into legislative, judicial and executive branches was a critical factor in the framing and
acceptance of the Constitution.193 According to Madison, the chief obstacle to fairness in the
legislature is conflict among factions where one interest group attempts to force its will on
others. 194 But in a large and diverse group, no single faction would have enough influence to
dominate the others.195 Rather, advocates achieve their ends by organizing coalitions and
persuading their colleagues.196
Because this balancing prevents abuse, legislative actions are given greater deference
than judicial or executive actions.197 However, this analysis is based on the separation of powers
as exhibited in the federal or state governments.198 For this model to operate according to the
framers’ intent, the legislative bodies must be of a sufficient size to contain a “variety of interests
that no one faction could tyrannize the others.”199 This is often not the case in city or county
governments where domination by a single interest or faction is more likely to occur.200
As a result, local legislative bodies provide fewer safeguards than a larger representative
body.201 One can argue that decisions by local lawmaking bodies are never fully legislative for
the purposes of judicial review.202 In decisions regarding land use, local governments will not be
restrained by the factors identified by Madison.203 Accordingly, the courts should defer less to
local land use decisions compared to those of state or federal lawmakers.204
Thus, defining a small- scale amendment as policy does not make it legislative and
deserving of deference.205 What gives legislature its legitimacy is the process of legislation.206
When this process loses its broad-based character and its distinction from an adjudicative body,
as typically occurs for local governments, the rationale for deference is also lost.
A second factor for questioning deference to local legislative decisions is that local
governments often do not strictly follow the notions of separate and distinct roles for legislative,
executive, and judicialofficials. 207 Typically, especially in smaller localities, elected bodies
perform duties that are administrative or quasi-judicial in nature as well as legislative.208 This
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practice is particularly relevant to zoning decisions.209 By rezoning, city councils or county
commissions make decisions that are quasi-judicial ( i.e., applying a law to a particular case).210
Commentators have asserted that the legislative/adjudicative split in zoning decisions
demonstrates the lack of validity in applyin g federal and state concepts to local government.211
The difference in applying separation of powers at the state and local levels is illustrated
in a Georgia Supreme Court case.212 A landowner challenged the constitutionality of an
ordinance for issuing bonds because the chief commissioner also served in the executive branch
of the county.213 The state supreme court held that the separation of powers under the state
constitution “has no relation to municipal offices, created by the legislature, in the discharge of
strictly municipal functions."214 This court explicitly held that the constitutional phrase, "[T]he
legislative, judicial, and executive powers shall forever remain separate and distinct; and no
person discharging the duties of one shall at the same time exercise the functions of either of the
others except as herein provided,” applied only to the state government and not to counties or
municipalities.215 The court added that as the county commission serves as both the executive
and legislative branches, the separation of powers could not apply to counties or to
municipalities.216

2. Legislative Decisions Lack Due Process
Another criticism of the application of the legislative fairly debatable standard of review
is that it denies procedural due process to those challenging the local government’s decision.217
The Court has observed that the role of procedural due process is to avoid erroneous results and
deprivations.218 Procedural due process applies to administrative or adjudicative actions but not
to legislative actions.219 Judge Posner asserted that "’[l]egislative due process’ seems almost an
oxymoron.”220 In principle, due process is not required for legislative acts because the large
number of constituents causes legislators to act reasonably.221

a) Elements of Due Process
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It is instructive to examine the specific elements of due process with respect to land use
decisions. The fundamental meaning of the due process clause is that at a minimum it requires
that “deprivation of life, liberty or property by adjudication be preceded by notice and
opportunity for hearing appropriate to the nature of the case.”222 Due process does not entail a
fixed procedure; rather it varies with the circumstances.223 Justice Brandeis observed that due
process assures: “[T]hat the trier of the facts shall be an impartial tribunal; that no findings shall
be made except upon due notice and opportunity to be heard; [and] that the procedure at the
hearing shall be consistent with the essentials of a fair trial....”224 The Oregon Supreme Court
summarized what the parties at a land use hearing are entitled to as follows: an opportunity to be
heard, an opportunity to present and rebut evidence, a tribunal which is impartial in the matter
(i.e., having had no pre-hearing or ex parte contacts concerning the question at issue), a record to
be made, and adequate findings executed.225 A Florida judge explained that “the quality of due
process required in a quasi-judicial hearing is not the same as that to which a party to the full
judicial hearing is required and that quasi-judicial proceedings are not “controlled by strict rules
of evidence and procedure.”226

b) Impartial Tribunal
A person with an interest in land that is affected by the zoning actions should be
precluded from voting on the matter as a conflict of interest.227 This practice of preventing
interested parties from voting is most likely to be observed in a meeting of a zoning board where
it is acting in the capacity of a quasi-judicial body.228 However, when such a body acts in a
legislative capacity, lawmakers with a bias frequently do not refrain from voting on such
matters.229 The courts, though, are precluded from examining a legislator’s motives.230
The perception of fairness is a principal reason for requiring an impartial tribunal, as lack
of such protection may lessen the trust in the adjudicative process.231 The Supreme Court has
strongly endorsed this concept by virtue of its stringent rules for disqualification of judges.232
The Court concedes that the rule may sometimes exclude judges who have no actual bias but
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whose participation may create a perception of bias.233 One can distinguish between the
standards of proving actual bias and the standards of the appearance of impartiality.234
There have been numerous documentations of abuse from this practice.235 For example, a
councilman voted to approve a rezoning which resulted in his own property value being
increased by $600,000.236 Because it was a legislative matter, however, this action was held not
to be reviewable by a court.237 In a less egregious case, Maine’s highest court determined that
procedural due process required vacating a decision made by commission board members who
had not heard the evidence or assessed the credibility of witnesses.238

c) Notice and the Opportunity to be Heard
These two fundamental precepts of due process are applied in various manners,
depending on the circumstances of the adjudicative bodies of local governments. Typically the
board or commission will hold a public hearing following public notification.239 In some cases
individuals with property or an interest directly affected by the proposed action receive direct
personal notice of the meeting.240 Depending on the magnitude and impact of the zoning change,
additional hearings or workshops may be held.241
Posner observed that due to the general nature of legislation, notice is impracticable, as
many of the persons affected by the legislation will be unknown and unknowable.242 Many local
governments are statutorily required to afford some level of notice and opportunity to be heard
for decisions by legislative bodies, as exemplified by Florida’s “sunshine” law.243 In the area of
zoning, some local governments require nearly the same notice and opportunity for legislative as
for quasi-judicial decisions.244 Some courts are, however, lenient in enforcing notice and the
opportunity to be heard and in allowing post-deprivation remedies when dealing with decisions
by a legislative body.245

d) Ex Parte Communications
Precluding ex parte communications would entail major change from current practice in
most local governments.246 Elected officials consider contact with constituents, including
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developers, attorneys and landowners, as part of their jobs.247 Non-elected officials also
frequently have meetings and discussions with potential parties to a zoning request.248 At the
very least, due process would require that the officials (elected or appointed) divulge the content
of the ex parte contacts at the hearing to enable interested parties to take account of them. The
Idaho Supreme Court held that ex parte telephone calls to city council members prior to a
hearing were outside the council’s record and violated due process.249 A Florida appellate court
held that a quasi-judicial land use decision was invalid due to an ex parte communications with
elected officials250 In response to citizen frustration with the prohibition of meeting with elected
officials, however, the legislature enacted a statute that specifically allowed voters access to their
representatives.251

e) Record of Findings
A record is needed to allow the court to determine whether the local government
followed the applicable rules of law and the procedures for fact-finding.252 Records not only
help the court exercise control over the decision-making body, but they also make the deciding
body more aware of its responsibilities and more likely to follow the procedures.253 Records of
fact-finding can also improve the quality of judicial review. Commentators have been critical of
the quality of the records kept.254
Florida Supreme Court Justice Pariente has criticized Snyder for not requiring a local
government board to enter written findings of fact in meeting its burden of showing that the
zoning achieves a legitimate purpose.255 She claimed that this omission may have
unintentionally “lessened rather than heightened the review of the zoning decision.”256 In the
same opinion, however, Justice Wells countered that the requirement for written findings in all
quasi-judicial decision would be too cumbersome and could result in boilerplate writings and
litigation over whether the writings are adequate.257 Other commentators have insisted that
written findings are essential for effective review of quasi-judicialdecisions. 258

3. Balancing the Efficiency of the Legislative Review Standard Against the Potential for Abuse
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It is important question is effect of the standard of review (quasi-judicial or legislative)
on the potential for abuse. Abuses occur when decisions are made on the basis of political
influence or favoritism, on the basis of inadequate procedure, or by uninformed government
officials. Correcting abuses was one of the articulated factors driving the Snyder decision to
establish quasi-judicial review in place of legislative review for certain land use transactions.259
There is a strong sense that quasi-judicial review will help prevent abuses because of the
due process afforded and the less deferential standard of review.260 Designating a process as
quasi-judicial would in theory enhance the challenger’s opportunity to present the case before a
tribunal, for example by exclusion of ex parte communication and by clarifying evidence rules.
In a local government, however, often it is the same individuals making both legislative and
quasi-judicial decision, but with different hats.261
A second significant difference between the quasi-judicial and legislative review
processes is the degree of deference granted by the courts to the decision-making body. To
overturn legislative decisions, the court must determine that the basis for the decision was
capricious or arbitrary and not even debatable.262 For quasi-judicialdecisions, the court still
defers to the judgment of the tribunal, but competent substantial evidence is required to preclude
reversal.263 Because local boards making zoning decision include elected officials and
appointees who may be unduly swayed by a subsection of the electorate, requiring that these
decisions be based on competent substantial evidence may be the most effective control for
small-scale amendments.264
These two features of legislative decisions as compared to quasi-judicial decisions (i.e.,
reduced due process and greater degree of deference) reinforce each other in limiting a citizen’s
ability to challenge the decision.265 Accordingly, the courts and legislature should assure that
there is a strong legal basis and a defensible rationale before providing that a decision be deemed
legislative.
Although some authorities have claimed that due process rules are too cumbersome,266
preventing abuse may justify erring on the side of less deference and greater due process.267
There is little evidence that local governments that provide comparable due process for both
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legislative and quasi-judicial zoning decision are overly burdened with the extra safeguards.268
On the other hand, because of the potential abuses of lawmaking bodies making decisions
without competent substantial evidence,269 there is a strong public policy argument for
establishing competent substantial evidence as the standard of review for zoning decisions.

B. Inequity and Lack of Consistency in Classifying
Small-Scale Amendments as Legislative Decisions

1. Small-Scale Amendments, Unlike Standard Amendments,Are N ot Policy Requiring the Fairly
Debatable Standard
The Coastal and Yusem decisions did not address the Snyder functional analysis test,
which provided a logical basis for determining whether a decision is legislative or quasi-judicial
(i.e., whether it formulates or applies policy).
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Rather, in those decisions, the courts applied a

purely mechanical rule for the standard of review for a comprehensive plan amendment with a
rationale that can be summarized as follows: 1) because it is an amendment, it is policy; 2)
because it is policy, it is legislative; and 3) because it is legislative, it deserves deference (i.e., the
fairly debatable standard of review).271
This rationale takes no account of the basic underlying principle for deferring to the
legislative based on historical practices or public policy.272 The policy/principle argument is as
follows: 1) the legislature is broad-based, responding to a diverse constituency; 2) this diverse
base gives it authority to make policy and makes it more difficult to provide due process or to
address individual concerns; 3) the ultimate recourse of represented citizens is via the ballot
box; and 4) thus, legislative decisions deserve deference.273
These latter factors are not present for a small-scale amendment. The legislation is not
broad-based, but rather is narrowly focused on a single parcel of land.274 Because it affects only
a single parcel, relatively few other landowners are affected and only a small segment of the
population will participate in the decision. Because of the limited interest, the legislators are
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unlikely to be voted out of office based on a small-scale amendment decision. Thus the decision
does not merit the deferential fairly debatable standard. 275
The nature of the specific review processes for small-scale and standard amendments
supports the claim that the former is not policy.276 For example, processing a small-scale
amendment in tandem with a rezoning indicates that the level of community interest and the
extent of debate anticipated for a small-scale amendment are similar to those of a small scale
rezoning, which is clearly not policy. 277 This process can be contrasted with that of standard
(i.e., large-scale) amendments, which are permitted only twice a year in Florida.278 For these
amendments, municipalities such as Jacksonville both anticipate and receive a much wider range
of input and comment.279
In Coastal, the City of Jacksonville Beach argued that any small-scale amendment would
require that the city council consider the policy impact of the amendment, including traffic,
utilities, and other services.280 Yet the City’s brief before the Florida Supreme Court mentioned
only that alternate vacant commercial space was available nearby and that the proposed
amendment would “violate the plan’s goal of encouraging the ‘infill’ of commercial
development…”281 It is hard to see how granting this change for an area less than two acres
could significantly affect the City’s overall growth plans. Moreover, the determination that the
change in land use is not consistent with a policy of promoting infill of existing areas is arguably
an application of policy, not a formulation of policy. Given the significance of this holding, the
court furnished no justification other than repeating that any change in the FLUM is a policy
decision.282 There are undoubtedly numerous examples of changes to FLUMs for small parcels
that likewise would have essentially no effect on policy. What is most troubling about the
Coastal bright-line rule is its absolute nature that allows no specific determination whether
policy is being formulated or applied.283

2. The Adoption Processes for Small-Scale Amendments and Rezonings are Similar, but their
Classifications Differ
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The practices of several municipalities confirm that the procedures for adopting smallscale amendment are very similar to those for small-scale rezoning.284 Yet, small-scale
amendments are deemed legislative decisions while rezonings are quasi- judicial, resulting in an
inherently inequitable judicial review process One procedural difference is that the adopted
small-scale amendment is submitted to the DCA for discretionary review, while a rezoning is
not.285 Unless there is a specific challenge, however, the DCA will not review a small-scale
amendment.286
The great similarity in review procedures is evidenced by the practice of processing a
small-scale amendment and a rezoning in tandem.287 In a tandem process, a local government
seeking to change the use of a small parcel of land to a use not consistent with the FLUM pairs
the small-scale amendment ordinance with a rezoning ordinance for the identical parcel.288
For example, in the City of Jacksonville the process is as follows.289 Following a review
and recommendation by staff, the paired ordinances are reviewed successively by the planning
commission (the designated land planning agency), the Land Use and Zoning Committee (a
subcommittee of the City Council) and the City Council.290 Although the ordinances are voted on
separately, the testimony for and against are presented at the same hearings.
The most significant substantive difference between these two actions is the type of
review afforded a challenger.291 A property owner disagreeing with the rezoning files a writ of
certiorari to a circuit court and force the municipality to bolster its denial with competent
substantial evidence.292 An owner disputing the amendment files a de novo action for declaratory
or injunctive relief; at the trial the local government must show only that the decision was not
arbitrary or capricious. 293
A party opposing the approval of paired ordinances would be able to challenge the
rezoning portion of the decision under a quasi-judicial process.294 But if the amendment were not
paired to a rezoning, the chances of getting the decision reversed would be greatly diminished
because of the fairly debatable standard applied to the amendment.295 On the other hand,
consider a person challenging a denial of a paired amendment and zoning change. If the
amendment were denied, the zoning board would not even vote on the proposed zoning as it
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would be incompatible with the land use map.296 The challenger would thus be limited to a de
novo court action with the burden to prove that the decision was not even fairly debatable.

3. Classifying all Rezoning as Quasi-Judicial is Inconsistent with Snyder’s Functional Analysis
The Court’s bright-line rule in Yusem and Coastal that all amendments are legislative
implied that all land use changes not involving a change tothe FLUM are quasi-judicial.297
Because the courts did not indicate otherwise, this rule also applies to large scale rezonings that
are consistent with the land use map.298 Allowing a rezoning of a large tract of land from (say)
low density residential to commercial could, however, have a major impact on the need for new
roads and utilities. Yet, under the strict rule it would be deemed quasi-judicial. Such a policy
seems to be imprudent and inconsistent with Snyder’s functional analysis test .299
After articulating its major rule that "[g]enerally speaking, legislative action results in the
formulation of a general rule of policy, whereas judicial action results in the application of a
general rule of policy,"300 Judge Grimes added in an often overlooked comment: “[a]pplying this
criterion, it is evident that comprehensive rezonings affecting a large portion of the public are
legislative in nature.” 301 Under Yusem-Coastal, however, a large-scale rezoning that it not part
of a plan amendment would not be subject to policy review or submitted to the DCA. 302 This
procedure frustrates the legislators’ intent by depriving the DCA and other affected local
governments and public agencies from potentially meaningful input.303
Yusem chose to distinguish rather than to overrule Snyder: “In Snyder II, we plainly did
not deal with the issue of the appropriate standard of review for amendments to a comprehensive
land use plan. 304 Judge Wells further e xplained the court’s position:
While we continue to adhere to our analysis in Snyder with respect to the type of
rezonings at issue in that case, we do not extend that analysis or endorse a
functional, fact-intensive approach to determining whether amendments to local
comprehensive land use plans are legislative decisions. Rather, we expressly
conclude that amendments to comprehensive land use plans are legislative
decisions.305
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Under an interpretation that Snyder classifies all rezonings that are policy as amendments, there
would be no need to retain Snyder as it would be identical to the bright line rule. Yet Yusem
implicitly affirms Snyder.306 The Coastal court’s comment on this distinction, “[h]owever, a
proposed zoning change under Snyder must be consistent with the FLUM, thus requiring policy
application instead of policy reformulation,” also implicitly affirms Snyder. 307
If Yusem and Coastal did not overrule Snyder, as indicated, the Snyder functional
analysis test is still valid for determining the standard of review for a rezoning not involving an
amendment, i.e., “ comprehensive rezonings affecting a large portion of the public are legislative
in nature.” 308 As a result, under Snyder, a small scale rezoning is typically quasi-judicial as it
affects only a small number of landowners and a small area, while a large-scale rezoning,
affecting a large area and number of individual, is a legislative decision.309 This analysis is
inconsistent with Coastal and Yusem, which imply that all rezoning are quasi-judicial.310
For amendments, on the other hand, the Snyder functional test is not valid according to
these same decisions.311 Instead the Coastal and Yusem Courts have established a bright-line rule
that all amendment are legislative. 312 The different approaches for classifying rezonings (Snyder
functional test) and amendments (Yusem–Coastal bright-line rule) result in a significant
inconsistency, which at the very least can cause confusion. Table 2 summarizes the apparent
positions of the three Florida Supreme Court decisions on the four types of zoning actions.

Table 2. Classification of Zoning Decisions from Florida Supreme Court Opinions313
Type of Land Use Action
Large Scale Amendment
Small Scale Amendment
Large Scale Rezoning
Small Scale Rezoning

Snyder
Legislative
Quasi-judicial
Legislative
Quasi-judicial

Yusem
Legislative
Not addressed
Quasi-judicial
Quasi-judicial

Coastal
Legislative
Legislative
Quasi-judicial
Quasi-judicial

The procedures adopted by several municipalities confirm the confusion and
inconsistency. Many, if not most of the municipalities in Florida treat all rezonings not involving
an amendment as quasi-judicial.314 In Jacksonville, a recent rezoning ordinance unaccompanied
by an amendment involved a tract with an area greater than 800 acres.315 This rezoning and
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similar rezonings were decided upon without providing copies to the Florida DCA, DOT or DEP
to review.316 In addition, although affected parties aware of the zoning action may seek
appropriate judicial review, many parties, including the public and public agencies, could be
seriously affected by this government action, yet not have an opportunity for meaningful review.

4. The Yusem-Coastal Bright-Line Rule Is Not Consistent with the Statutory Differences
Between Small-Scale and Standard Amendments
The Yusem–Coastal bright line rule defines all amendments as legislative, subject to the
fairly debatable standard of review.317 The basic rationale is that these are all formulations of
policy subject to the extensive multi-agency state-wide review process.318 However, because a
small-scale amendment differs substantially from a standard amendment in its nature and in the
approval process, requiring the same classification for all amendments is not appropriate.
A zoning change of ten acres or less that amends only the FLUM, but does not alter the
text of the comprehensive plan, qualifies as a small-scale amendment.319 The legislature does not
require DCA to review such an amendment because it typically involves only a single parcel, it
affects only a small number of interests, and it does not involve a new policy. Similarly, because
it has not undergone substantive, if any, policy review at the local government level, the standard
of review should be quasi-judicial.320 It is instructive to compare the type of review at the local
government for a small scale amendment with the semi-annual comprehensive plan amendments.
For the latter, there is substantially more discussion and debate addressing real policy issues such
as the amendment’s impact on traffic, schools, and utilities.321
It is noteworthy that the 1995 amendments to the Florida statutes that streamlined the
state review for a small-scale amendment were enacted following Snyder (1993) but prior to
Yusem (1997).322 Thus, the legislators were aware of the Snyder functional analysis test under
which a small-scale amendment would be subject to quasi-judicial review if it were an
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application of policy rather than a formulation of policy.323 The legislature’s elimination of a
major portion of the review process of a small-scale amendment is consistent with a recognition
that such an amendment does not involve formulation of policy based on the Snyder functional
analysis test.324 Yusem and Coastal established a protocol that is intrinsically different from the
one in Snyder for determining the standard of review for zoning changes.325 The difference
hinges on whether it involves an amendment. Under Yusem and Coastal, if the change involves
an amendment, the decision is always legislative. 326 Under Snyder, if the change involves
another zoning action, the decision is based on the functional analysis test.327 Thus,under
Snyder, a rezoning not involving an amendment may be legislative or quasi-judicial depending
on the number of individuals affected.328
In response to an amicus curiae brief, the City of Jacksonville Beach noted that although
the review processes for small-scale and standard amendments differ, this difference “does not
transform what is a quintessential legislative act into one which is quasi-judicial.”
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The City

also noted that the procedure still allows the state to intervene during the adoption phase to
ensure that the amendment complies with the statute.330 This response did not, however, suggest
how the DCA would be alerted to the need to intervene without having previously reviewed the
amendment. It also does not address the reduced capability of challenging the amendment.

V. CONCLUSIONS
This article re-examines the holding in Coastal that a small-scale amendment is a
legislative decision subject to the fairly debatable judicial standard of review. The author
maintains that the Yusem-Coastal bright-line rule fails to properly account for inequities and
inconsistencies in the law. As a result, the Court has not eliminated confusion or established a
consistent, rational means for classifying land use decisions.
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A. Small- Scale Amendments Are Not Policy
Small-scale amendment should not be classed as legislative decisions because the
traditional separation of powers argument breaks down at the local level and because the
decisions do not formulate policy. On a federal or state level, the legislature’s broad base and
diversity of input justify giving great deference to legislative decisions. This diversity of input,
which allows coalitions to offset one another to prevent dominance, is simply not present for a
local government. As a result, there is greater opportunity for undue influence by powerful
developers and others, with a far greater likelihood of abuse in land use decisions.
Not only does the legislature not operate under the federal model envisioned by the
framers, but there is often no true separation of powers at the local level. In many instances,
council or commission members serve on both legislative and quasi-judicial bodies. This
arrangement does not justify separate judicial review processes depending on which hat the
individuals were wearing at the time of the decision.
Defining a small-scale amendment as policy does not make it legislative and deserving
of deference. What gives legislature its legitimacy is the process of legislation. When this
process loses its broad-based character and its distinction from an adjudicative body, as typically
occurs for local councils or commissions, the rationale for deference is also lost. The Snyder
court and numerous commentators have furnished ample documentation of abuses by biased
decision-makers.331
The evidence also clearly indicates that a small-scale amendment, as defined by the
Florida law, is not necessarily a true policy decision. A change in the FLUM for a small parcel of
land will often have a non-negligible impact only on those landowners in the immediate vicinity.
It seems unlikely that the local board or council will thoroughly examine the impact on a broad
range of policy issues of each amendment as suggested in the Yusem and Coastal opinions,
particularly with strong commercial interests at stake.332
The state and local procedures support this interpretation. The Florida statutory procedure
does not require routine review of small-scale amendments by DCA or other public agencies.333
35

At the local level, several municipalities provide essentially the same review procedures for a
small-scale amendment and for a rezoning.334 The inference is that the type of review conducted
at the local level depends on the extent of impact, thereby resembling the Snyder functional
analysis test. Accordingly, there is no basis for a different classification and standard of review
for small-scale amendment and small scale rezonings.

B. Land Use Action Classifications are Inconsistent and Conflicting
The statutes and case law provide an inconsistent framework for classifying land use
decisions by local governments. Because Yusem and Coastal explicitly stated that they were not
overruling Snyder regarding land use decisions not involving a plan amendment, the latter
court’s functional analysis test is still valid for rezonings. This test would conceivably classify
the rezoning of a large and strategically placed parcel of land as a formulation of policy,
requiring a legislative review process. However, according to the Yusem-Coastal bright-linetest,
only amendments are legislative, with all other rezonings classified as quasi-judicial.335 Thus, for
a large scale rezoning, the Snyder functional analysis test results in a different classification than
the Yusem-Coastal bright line rule. In essence, the court is deferring to the local government to
implement Snyder. Local zoning codes, however, typically do not distinguish between smallscale and standard rezonings. A standard rezoning, affecting a larger number of constituents,
though generating substantial discussion of policy, will not be designated as a legislative
decision.336
The Coastal -Yusem rule that provides the same standard of review for all comprehensive
plan amendments is not consistent with the state statutes. The 1995 amendment to the Growth
Management Act established significant changes in the procedures for reviewing a small-scale
amendment, suggesting that the legislature considered these actions substantively different from
standard plan amendments.337 The principal difference is that there is no external independent
body (i.e., DCA or other agency) reviewing the small-scale amendment for consistency with
state statutes, regional plans or state-wide plans or verifying the internal consistency of the
amended plan.338 This situation differs significantly from the multi-stage review described by
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Coastal in justifying the classification of the small-scale amendment.339 The fact that the
legislative amendments were enacted following Snyder, but prior to Yusem or Coastal, support
the claim that they are more consistent with Snyder.

C. Lack of Procedural Due Process Is a Concern for Local Land Use Decisions
Deference to local boards is based on a misplaced faith that the legislative process
protects public and private interests against unfair or biased decisions. The inherent reduction of
due process for a legislative decision compared to a quasi-judicial one may significantly affect
challengers’ rights at the local level. Although notice and an opportunity to be heard, the most
important facets of procedural due process, are widely available in local decisions, local bodies
do not adequately address ex parte communication or the need for unbiased decision making.
Where elected officials also serve in a quasi-judicial capacity, the nature of local governments
may make enforcing ex parte rules impractical. Establishing independent commissions for the
quasi-judicial decision may be especially burdensome on very small counties or cities and is
likely to generate resistance.340
Although local governments are not likely to require formal due process even for quasijudicial hearings, they must at least assure a process that prevents blatant abuse of ex parte
communication and bias by lawmakers. Examples of mitigating factors are requiring records of
certain ex parte communications, strict ethics codes for decision-makers, and vigilant press
coverage.
Commentators and judges have weighed in both for and against requiring record-keeping
of fact finding. In an era where the need for transparency and accountability in government are
universally agreed upon, the arguments for requiring records seem persuasive. The ease and
convenience of acquiring and retaining electronic records support this conclusion.
Local governments should be aware that although due process is not formally required
for a legislative decision, the procedures afforded the aggrieved landowner may be the only
realistic opportunity to win the case, given the limited opportunity for judicial review. Thus,
independent of the implications for judicial review, due process is essential to assure that the
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decision is a fair one arrived at in a recognized fair and reasonable manner. The effort to resolve
these problem will be offset by the potential reduction or elimination of “the confusion,
corruption and abuse of individual rights which is inherent…” in the legislative process.341

D. The Court’s Reasons for the Fairly Debatable Standard Are Not Convincing
The reasons offered by the Coastal-Yusem court do not support imposing the fairly
debatable standard on an aggrieved landowner seeking to challenge a local government’s
decision. Coastal maintained that in spite of the lack of mandatory review by the DCA, the
existence of other remedies available to affected parties constituted sufficient safeguards.342
Unfortunately, these remedies do not provide the affected person with the right to challenge
based on the competent substantial evidence standard.
Coastal’s other claimed benefit of the holding was that the bright-line rule offered
uniformity and certainty in land use decisions.343 One counter is that because of the
inconsistencies of Coastal with the statutes and with Snyder in classifying a large scale rezoning,
the courts may be faced with additional challenges on the validity of these laws. Moreover,
certainty in the judicial outcome is not always a virtue if the decision results in inequities or in
inadequate legal remedies for grievances.

E. Recommendations for Legislative Reform

Although the intent of this article is not to develop a detailed proposal for modifying the
procedures for reviewing small-scale amendments, guidelines are presented below for legislative
reform of the process.
1. Eliminate the Distinction Between Legislative and Quasi-Judicial Review for Zoning Actions.
The review of all zoning actions should be based on a standard of competent substantial
evidence or equivalent. There is no reason the government should not be required to provide this
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level of specificity to establish its case. One proposed mechanism is the “rational justification
rule” suggested by Siemon and Kendig.344

2. Eliminate the Two Levels of Review for Small-Scale and Standard Plan Amendments
State statutory review should be limited to zoning changes that have a significant impact
on policy or that affect a large number of interested parties.345 To achieve this, it is recommended
that the legislature establish criteria for types of zoning change requiring review by DCA and
other public and government agencies such as the following:
o Comprehensive plan amendments greater than ten acres, along with other criteria
under the current statutes;
o Zoning changes of greater than some minimum tract size (e.g., fifty acres); and
o Other tracts based on special circumstances such as: requests by the local government
based on guidelines; or requests by interested parties based on recognized criteria and
possibly requiring authorization from a magistrate.

3. Establish Minimal Due Process Requirements.
State statutes are needed to ensure minimal criteria for impartial tribunal (based on strict
conflict of interest limitations and disclosure of communication), record of findings for all
adjudicatory or advisory local government bodies, and modified restriction on ex parte
communication, Although it is not practical to limit ex parte entirely, strict guidelines are needed
requiring advance notification where possible and strict reporting of contacts. In addition,
although most local governments provide adequate notice and opportunity to be heard and to
present evidence, the legislature should codify these by statute.
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